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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

SALINA CREEK IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent_,
vs ..
STATE OF UTAH; WAYNE D.
CRIDDLE, State Engineer of the
State of Utah; ABRAHAM IRRICase No.
GATION COMPANY; CENTRAL
9430
UTAH WATER COMPANY;
DELTA CANAL COMPANY;
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY; MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, and W. C. Cole,
Sevier River Water Commissioner,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING

The issue before this Court in the original appeal
and the real issue of the Petition for Re-hearing made
by defendants and appellants, is the interpretation of
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the term "minimum rights" as used in the Cox Decree
at Page 230.
The rights of numerous water users detailed in the
Cox Decree are by specific wording designated as
"minimum rights." The appellants seek to have this
Court change the description of "minimum rights" in
the Cox Decree by adding the ambiguous phrase "one
flow right" as being a minimum right. No right in the
Cox Decree is described as "One Flow". Such a phrase
implies there should be "Two Flow" or "Three Flow"
rights. That such a confusion has never been permitted
by this Court is illustrated by the following principles
and facts.
The concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion
agree with the majority opinion "that there is no ambiguity in the language of the Cox Decree". The majority
opinion holds, with reference to the question of ambiguity of the language: "Since tins is stated in clear
and unambiguous language, we have no choice but to
fallow the mandate of the decree." The concurring
opinion agrees by stating: "Said decree simply and
clearly said in 1936 what the main opinion, in its third
paragraph, said it said." The dissenting opinion begins
by stating: "We are not _persuaded that there is any
ambiguity in the Cox Decree in providing that a user
has a "maximum and a minimum" right. That phrase
should require no further explanation."
The majority opinion states:
2
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"There is no statement in the (Cox Decree)
which supports or justifies the order of the State
Engineer that the maxiinum rights of prior appropriators 'may not .he satisfi~d until a~l .other
direct flow rights, designated either as minimum
rights or given only one flow right, and those
listed on pages 195 to 197 of said decree' are
fully satisfied."
Analyzing the exception to "first in time, first in
right" at Page 230 of the Cox Decree, the first part
of the sentence clarifies that all water-rights are to be
measured to the user or owner according to their respective dates of priority, indicating that the water-rights
of prior priority date take to the exclusion of the later
dated priority rights. Then the language in question is
inserted as an exception to this general rule. The exception, however, is specifically limited by the language
to those water-rights that were decreed as "maximum
and minimum" rights in the Decree. It is only that
kind of rights that are included in the exception.
There is no hint in the language that any other type
of rights were being affected by the language in question other than in situations "where a maxiinum and
minimum right is herein decreed." To construe that
"one flow rights" are included within the meaning of
the language is clearly adding to the language something that is not there and is not a matter of interpreting
the language as written. The only purpose of the provision is to provide in those situations where maximum
and minimum rights. have been decreed that the minimum rights of all subsequent maximum and minimum

3
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appropriators be satisfied before the maximum rights
of the prior maximum and minimum appropriators may
be filled. There is no reference to "one flow" rights.
Nowhere in the Cox Decree can one find a definition for
or a concept of "one flow". The attempt of appellants
and the State Engineer to include these "one flow"
rights in the term "minimum rights", where it happens
to serve the purpose of appellants, is clearly contrary
to all rules of construction found in the law to date.
"Minimum right" is mentioned three times in the
clause in question. It is an impossibility to include "one
flow rights" within the meaning of "minimum right"
the first two times that term is used. The term is used
the third time without making reference to any other
rights than those referred to when it was used the
first two times. "Minimum rights" as used the third
time had reference to the very same rights, i.e. "where
a maximum and minimum right is herein decreed."
Even if respondents were to concede for argumentative purposes that the term "minimum right" is used
the third time in a general way, so that it possibly could
include other rights such as the ambiguously described
"one flow" rights, the rules of construction announced
by the Utah Supreme Court which preclude the giving
of an enlarged meaning to the term "minimum rights".
The Utah Supreme Court in Donahue v. Warner
Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp._, 272 Pac. (2d) 177,
184 ( 1954), was called on to interpret the meaning of
a phrase. One party contended the phrase had a general
4
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meaning and therefore included the activity in question~
Judge Crockett, writing the opinion for the Court,
rejected the argument as a matter of construction, stating the rule of construction to be :
" ... It is a well recognized rule of statutory
construction where general terms are used following specific ones, the general must be understood in the light of and as characterized by .the
specific, and are limited to things of like kind

"
This rule of construction has been consistently
applied by the Utah Supreme Court. For instance, in
the case of Memorial Gardens of the Valley v. Love_,
300 Pac. (2d) 628 (1956), one of the parties argued
that a term in a statute was a general term and its meaning should be expanded to include the item in question.
Judge Crockett, speaking for the majority of the Court,
held that the rules of construction prohibited the giving
of expanded meanings to general terms---when the general terms are used with reference to specific items. The
rule of construction was set forth as follows:
"Such general terms cannot be given a literal
meaning independent of the context in which
they are used. 'They must be understood in the
light of and as characterized by the purpose of
the statute, and viewed in relation to the entire
context. When specific terms are followed by
general terms, the latter are limited to things of
like kind."
The same rule of construction was again applied
by the Utah Supreme Court in th ecase of Anderson
v. Utah County_, 368 Pac. (2d) 912.
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Minimum rights have been specifically defined and
designated in the Cox Decree wherever awarded, therefore, according to the above stated rules of construction,
the term "minimum right" (as used the third time)
which appellants contend includes "one flow" rights
could not include rights other than those described,
defined and designated as minimum rights in the Cox
Decree.

An additional guide to interpreting terms of a
statute or decree was announced by the Utah Supreme
Court in Perris v. Perris, 202 Pac. (2d) 731. One of
the parties in that case contended that the term
"charges" had a general meaning and included the item
in question .. The Court rejected the argument, based
on the following stated rule of construction:
"Noscitur a sociis, prevails. Hence, the meaning of particular terms in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to words associated
with them in the statute.... It is also a familiar
policy in the construction of terms of a statute
to take into consideration the meaning naturally
attaching to them from the context, and to adopt
that sense of the words which best harmonizes
with the context. . . . "
The term "minimum right", which appellants contend includes "one flow" rights, refers to and is associated in the sentence with the term "maximum and
minimum rights", with the term "minimum right" describing rights awarded in the Cox Decree. Therefore,
pursuant to the above stated rule of construction the
meaning of "mini1num right" as used the third time in

6
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the sentence is li1nited to 1ninimum rights of that group
of appropriators whose water right is designated a
"minimum right" by the Cox Decree.
The term "one flow" rights was conjured by the
State Engineer apparently to enlarge upon "minimum
rights" so designated in the Cox Decree and include
something less than all other rights but including certain
rights described in the Cox Decree other than those
rights in the Decree described as "maximum and minimum". He excludes storage rights and implies something less than all other rights were to be included, but
further clouds the issue by including A to F rights.
No water user has any way of knowing whether the
ter1n "one flow" rights includes all rights other than
those described as "maximum" and "storage rights"
or whether the designation is the least of all flow rights
a user has acquired or possesses; or is the "A" right
of the A to F or A to L rights, or any other of the
many rights described in the Decree. Is "one flow"
limited to rights described as a flow of a certain amount
of cubic feet per second as contrasted with those rights
described in acre feet and those describe as storage
rights? There is no reference in the Cox Decree to any
class of rights termed as "one flow" rights. If this term
is added to the meaning of 1ninimum right, additional
litigation will be necessary to define what is meant by
"one flow rights". Therefore, the result of accepting
appellants' contention or affirming the State Engineer
would be to cause more confusion rather than to settle
a matter.
7
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The term "one flow" rights is an anomoly. No
matter how it is defined, it brings about incongruous
results.
For example, Abraham Irrigation Company, Central Utah Water Company and Deseret Irrigation
Company, appellant water users, serve designated irrigated lands. Each is awarded in the Decree numerous
rights, all of which come to it after storage of the water
in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir. Some of these rights
are designated in the Cox Decree at Page 196 as follows:
Class "A"

Priority
1874
1874

Abraham Irrigation Company 59 c.f.s.
Deseret Irrigation Company
74 c.f.s.
Central Utah Water Company 12.4 c.f.s.

none

Class "B"
Abraham Irrigation Company 5
Deseret Irrigation Company
10.7 c.f.s.

1874
1874

Class "C"
Central Utah Water Company 12.5 c.f.s.

none

Class "D"
Abraham Irrigation Company 4285.6 acre ft.
Deseret Irrigation Company
5714.4 acre ft.

1890
1890

Class "E"
Central Utah Water Company 5.8 c.f.s.

none
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This designation of the rights shows, first, that the
combination of all of a company's rights are a maximum
right; that as to Central Utah Water Company, the
Class "E" flow right without priority is its least right;
that the 5 c.f.s. of Abraham and 10.7 c.f.s. of Deseret
Class "B" are their least rights. But what designation
does one give the combined 10,000 acre feet Class "D"
right? This is obviously a storage right, but what is
there to designate one right a flow right and one a
storage right, when all such are received after storage
in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir?
Also the question arises as to what computation or
regulation could be made of the water in the river as of
any given day when a right is expressed in acre feet.
Could an acre foot be a flow fight?
The adding of "one flow rights" to the meaning
of "minimum rights" forces the Court to add other
words by way of d~fining the term added. The problem
becomes so complex when the term "one flow right" is
applied to the A to L rights up river, the designated
maximum and minimuin rights upstream and on the
tributary San Pitch River that an insertion of such a
new phrase or concept would take years of study to
evaluate.
As pointed out in the main Brief, counsel for the
State Engineer conceded that such a concept would
make nugatory all rights designated as maximum rights.
Also as pointed out in our original Brief, counsel for
appellants conceded the designation of their rights
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as A to F was only another way of expressing maximum
and minimum.
The provisions on Page 230 of the Cox Decree
should be enforced as it is written. Neither "one flow
rights" nor any other rights should be added to the
unambiguous language. Appellants' contention should
be rejected and the Court should affirm the interpretation given by the majority opinion. Inasmuch as none
of the appellants have rights designated as minimum
rights, the order and judgment of the District Court
is a correct adjudication of the rights of the parties to
this action.
Respectfully submitted,
Wilford M. Burton
Henry D. Moyle, Jr.
Barrie G. McKay
Attorneys for Respondents
720 Newhouse Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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